The aim of this paper is to propose a model of decision-making for lotteries. The key element of the theory is the use of lottery qualities. Qualities allow the derivation of optimal decision-making processes and are taken explicitly into account for lottery evaluation. Our contribution explains the major violations of the expected utility theory for decisions on two-point lotteries and shows the necessity of giving explicit consideration to the lottery qualities.
Introduction
Over the last fifty years many theories have been proposed to explain the results of lottery tests (for a survey of the main results see Machina, 1987; McFadden, 1999; Luce, 2000) . However, even for the simplest two-point lotteries, no theory is able to take into account all tests together. The goal of this paper is to use lottery qualities to build up a model that will take into account all possible tests related to both the pricing and comparison of two-point lotteries and, second, explain why it is optimal for an agent to act according to the test results.
There exist two important features about lottery tests: (1) the existence of lottery qualities and (2) the presence of more than one cognitive process. Regarding the existence of lottery qualities, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , among others, have already tested the difference between the positive and negative qualities for monetary amounts x i . Prelec (1998) has pointed out the qualitative difference between impossibility (p i = 0) and possibility (p i ∈ ]0,1[) for probabilities, while Tversky and Kahneman (1979) have looked at certainty (p i = 1) as another quality.
The presence of more than one cognitive process can be illustrated by the preference reversal paradox (Tversky et al., 1990, Lichtenstein and , where a majority of subjects would prefer lottery A to lottery B in a direct choice but give a higher judged price to lottery B. In this choice, it was always possible for subjects to price each lottery first and then compare the two prices. The test result obtained clearly shows that individuals do not price before making their choices. We must then conclude that there exist at least two different cognitive processes and that individuals have preferences regarding these processes. In this paper, we shall condense the choices of all processes into one simple principle which consists in splitting of sets into more homogeneous subsets.
The concept of qualities will be shown to be useful in two different ways. First, qualities determine the decision process and, second, they serve as explicit elements in the lottery judgment. So, the role played by qualities seems strong enough to justify the necessity of using them.
In non-expected utility (NEU) models such as Σw(p i )u(x i ) Tversky, 1979, Edwards, 1955) , p i and x i are always first evaluated with the functions w and u and then the summation of the different products are used to evaluate the lotteries. In expected utility (EU), w(p i ) = p i for all i, and the same type of evaluation process is used for all lotteries. In this paper, we shall show that considering qualities in the choice process makes it possible to extend the most common models in two directions. First, as in the current literature, it allows individuals to make a primary judgment of p i and x i whenever it seems optimal. Second, individuals can use the product of judged p i and x i (as in NEU or EU) but again only when it is optimal. For example, they may also, as in Rubinstein (1988) and Leland (1994) , compare the two p i and the two x i in some cases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lists the fourteen more problematic empirical facts culled from the literature on two-point lotteries and Section 3 defines vectors of qualities and a relation that orders these vectors. In Section 4, we use these two definitions to explain how the agent selects optimal processes (Definition 4) and evaluates lotteries (Definitions 5.1 and 5.2). Section 5 presents numerical examples and discusses the fourteen facts in relation with these examples. Section 6 concludes.
Facts about two-point lotteries Notation
The notation {a,b} is for a set and the notation (a,b) is for an ordered pair. A monetary amount with values in ]-∝,∝[ is denoted x i , and x i ∈ X, the set of monetary amounts. A probability with values in [0,1] is denoted p i , and p i ∈ P, the set of probabilities. A lottery where the agent can win x i with probability p i and 0 otherwise is denoted (p i ,x i ).The set of the two elements of this lottery is l i = {p i ,x i }.
A lottery where the agent can win x i with probability p i and x i-1 with probability 1-p i is denoted (1,x i-1 ;p i ,x i -x i-1 ) and l i = {1,x i-1 ,p i ,x i -x i-1 }. For convenience we assume that ⎪x i-1 ⎪< ⎪x i ⎪. This notation puts the emphasis on the fact that, when x i-1 ≠ 0, the agent first considers a sure monetary amount x i-1 and then a lottery (p i ,x i -x i-1 ), which is almost equivalent to the concept of segregation in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as discussed in Luce (2000) . The more basic tests for two-point lotteries are the judged certainty equivalent (subjects are asked to select a price), the choice certainty equivalent (subjects choose between a lottery and a sure monetary amount) and the comparison involving two lotteries. Almost every test involves some difficulties for theoreticians. We list below fourteen of the more problematic facts associated with these tests.
Lotteries: (p i ,x i ), x i > 0.
Fact #1:
In a lottery choice between lotteries A and B, if p i A is high and p i B is low, both yielding the same von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility, a majority of subjects will select lottery A. (Tversky et al., 1990) .
Fact #2:
When two lotteries A and B with the same expected value are compared and the probabilities p i A > p i B are both high, a majority of subjects will choose lottery A.
However, when both probabilities are low and the ratio p i A /p i B remains the same, a majority of subjects will choose lottery B. This is the common ratio paradox.
( Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; MacCrimon and Larsson, 1979) .
Fact # 3:
When subjects are asked to select a price (judged certainty equivalent JCE) for the lotteries (p i ,x i ), lottery A with high probability of winning is underestimated, while lottery B with a low probability of winning is overestimated A very important point often neglected in the literature is the next one.
Fact # 4:
In comparing two lotteries, it is always possible for subjects to price each lottery first and then compare the two prices. But the test results (Facts #1 and #3) clearly imply that individuals do not price before making their choices. So we have to explain why pricing lotteries is not optimal when subjects face a lottery choice.
Fact # 5:
If we compare a lottery with a sure monetary amount or with a series of sure monetary amounts, we obtain the choice certainty equivalent CCE. Tversky et al. (1990) found that CCE = JCE for lotteries with high probabilities but CCE < JCE for lotteries with low probabilities. We have to explain these results and why it is not optimal for subjects to price (JCE) first when asked to choose between a lottery with a high p i and a sure monetary amount (CCE).
Lotteries: (p i ,x i ), x i < 0.
Fact # 6:
One can also note that for the CCE and the common ratio paradox where x i > 0, the observed preferences run counter to the ones for lotteries where x i < 0 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) .
Lotteries: (1,x i-1 ;p i ,x i -x i-1 ) x i ,x i-1 > 0.
Fact # 7:
When p i is high, the JCE of a lottery (1,x i-1 ;p i ,x i -x i-1 ) where an agent can win x i with probability p i or x i-1 otherwise is smaller than the JCE of a lottery (p i ,x i ) where the agent can still win x i with probability p i but 0 otherwise .
Fact # 8:
In direct choices, the lottery (1,x i-1 ;p i ,x i -x i-1 ) where an agent can win x i with probability p i or x i-1 otherwise is preferred to a lottery (p i ,x i ) where the agent can still win x i with probability p i but 0 otherwise. This result, opposite to that of Fact #7, yields another reversal of preferences (Birnbaum and Sutton, 1992) .
Consequently, the agent does not price the two lotteries when facing a lottery choice and we have to show again that the pricing of each lottery is not always optimal for this case.
Fact # 9:
The graph of the JCE for the lottery (1,x i-1 ;p i ,x i -x i-1 ) as a function of p i has an inverse S-shape like the one for the case where x i-1 = 0. Moreover, x i-1 + JCE of (p i ,x i ) ≠ JCE of (1,x i-1 ;p i ,x i ) and the difference between the two JCE decreases when p i increases (Birnbaum and Sutton, 1992) .
Fact # 10:
For lotteries (x i , x i-1 > 0) the JCE is equal to the CCE for high and low probabilities of gain, contrary to Fact #5 where x i-1 = 0 and x i > 0 ) (see Alarie and Dionne, 2004 , for a discussion).
Lotteries: (1,x i-1 ;p i ,x i -x i-1 ), x i-1 < 0 < x i .
This subsection introduces an additional complexity, namely the presence of negative and positive outcomes in the same lottery. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have already pointed out the asymmetry between these outcomes and its consequence for expected utility theory. Below, we present additional facts that show the significance of this asymmetry for lottery choices and pricing.
Fact # 11:
When an agent is indifferent to a choice between a lottery (1,x i-1 ; p i ,x i -x i-1 ) and a sure monetary amount 0, the value of |x i-1 | is a lot smaller than |x i |. This result is far too extreme to be explained by a wealth effect or by decreasing risk aversion as Tversky and Kahneman (1992) have pointed out.
Fact # 12:
For comparisons of lotteries with the same expected value as in Bostic et al. (1990) , the lottery with the monetary amount x i-1 closer to 0 is always chosen.
Fact # 13:
In two of the four tests in Bostic et al. (1990) there exists a reversal of preferences, while there is no reversal for the other two tests. This situation is more complex than the one for lotteries (p i ,x i ) where reversals are observed for all tests (Tversky et al. 1990 ).
Fact # 14:
For this type of lottery (x i-1 < 0 < x i ), CCE = JCE for high probabilities but CCE < JCE for low probabilities ). This result is like the ones for lotteries (p i ,x i ) (Fact #5) and runs counter to the ones where x i-1 ,x i > 0 (Fact #10).
These fourteen facts strongly suggest that an evaluation function designed to take all of them into account simultaneously would be different from those already documented in the literature. This is why we analyse the processes behind the preferences in order to construct a unified explanation of the fourteen facts above listed. Then an evaluation function is derived from this analysis in Section 5.
Qualities of lotteries
We now present a model which yields optimal decision processes and takes into account the preceding facts. We first define the vector of qualities associated with any set of elements p i and x i , and then the lexicographic order relation ≺ L used to compare different vectors.
Vector of Qualities
We described four collections of sets of qualities ℘ j , j=1,...,4. They may contain the two sets P and X, their union and their intersection or any set of other lottery qualities described below, along with their unions and their intersections. In a first step, each group of elements p i and x i is naturally split into elements that belong respectively to the sets P and X defined in Section 2. So, the first collection of sets of qualities becomes ℘ 1 = {P,X,P∪X,∅} where ∅ = P∩X. Monetary amounts can be positive or negative and these qualities are already mentioned in the literature (Tversky and Kahneman 1992 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992) .
As in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , we assume that probabilities have surety (S) and risk (R) qualities. Prelec (1998) value of p*, the fixed point of the inverse S-shape probability weighting function, larger than 0.3 but smaller than 0.5, is observed in many tests (see Prelec, 1998 , for a discussion) 2 . In this paper we assume that p* belongs to [0.3,0.5] . So the fourth collection is ℘ 4 = {H,L,P,∅}. The existence of H and L is empirically supported by the common ratio paradox (Fact # 2), the comparison in the preference reversal (Fact # 1) and the pricing of lotteries (Fact # 3), where, in each of these tests, one can observe a different way of judging the probabilities that belong to H and L.
Each element p i or x i or each set of these elements has a vector of qualities denoted Q(•) = (q 1 ,q 2 ,q 3 ,q 4 ) where the set q j ∈ ℘ j . The set q j associated with one p i or x i is the intersection of all sets of ℘ j that contains this p i or x i . For example, the probability p i = 1 belongs to the next four sets of ℘ 3 that are S, R∪S, S∪I, and P.
Then S ∩ (R∪S) ∩ (S∪I) ∩ P = S and the q 3 of p i = 1 is S. S is the smallest set included in all other sets. When there is no such a set, then q j = ∅. For example, the q 2 of any probability is ∅, because a probability cannot have monetary values. Any set of probabilities or monetary amounts is denoted Θ n where the superscript n = 1,2,… identifies the different sets used in the Optimal Process (to be defined). The vector of qualities of the set Θ n is denoted Q(Θ n ). Sometimes when it is pertinent we write each element of the set rather than Θ A partition of a set Θ n is a collection of disjoint subsets of Θ n whose union is all of Θ n . In this paper, the partitions of Θ n are always composed of two sets denoted Θ 2n , Θ 2n+1 ≠ ∅. Figure 1 shows the first partition considered in Example 3.2. ). We will conclude that the sets Θ 2n and Θ 2n+1 are also more different than the sets Θ 2m and Θ
Definition 2: Lexicographic order relation
A relation ≺ L on ℘ 1 x℘ 2 x℘ 3 x℘ 4 is defined as Q(Θ 2n ) ∩ Q(Θ 2n+1 ) ≺ L Q(Θ 2m ) ∩ Q(Θ 2m+1 ), if there exists a ĵ such that ( ∩ 2n J q 2n 1 J q + ) ⊂ ( ∩ ) and, for all j < ĵ, ( ∩ ) = ( ∩ 2m J q 2m 1 J q + 2n j q 2n 1 j q + 2m j q 2m 1 j q + ). So when Q(Θ 2n ) ∩ Q(Θ 2n+1 ) ≺ L Q(Θ 2m ) ∩ Q(Θ 2m+1 ),
2m+1
. For a partition of Θ n into two sets, the more homogeneous their elements, the more the two sets will differ. ≺ L is nonreflexive and transitive, but it is a partial order relation because comparability fails (Munkres, 1975) . Because we use the lexicographic order relation, the positions of the qualities in the vectors are important. The most natural difference between qualities is the one between probabilities (P) and monetary amounts (X). This is why this difference is the first one, ∩ , considered in the vector of qualities ( ∩ pointed out in the literature seems more significant than the one between the qualities of H and L, suggested in this article. In the remainder of this article, we will keep this order based on empirical tests. However, any other order is possible and, for example, some agents may find that H and L (0.9 vs 0.2) are more different than R and S (0.9 vs 1).
Optimal process and evaluation of lottery
With the help of the two preceding definitions of vector of qualities and lexicographic order relation ≺ L , we are now able to define an optimal process and to evaluate lotteries.
Optimal Process
An optimal process (OP) is obtained by comparing partitions of sets of elements p i and x i in a recursive manner. We obtain an OP by first ranking partitions of the first set Θ 1 . Then each set of the partition is split into other partitions and so on. We use the lexicographic order relation (Definition 2) to compare the intersection of the vector of qualities of each pair of sets (
)) since the more the two sets differ the more similar the elements contained in each. Payne et al. (1993) pointed out that it is more complex to evaluate two different elements (p 1 and x 1 for example) than to compare two similar elements (p 1 and p 2 , for example).
However, all partitions are not admissible in an OP. As we have seen, each set must be different from the empty set. We must also take into account the natural link between an x i and its corresponding probability p i to prevent non−natural judgments such as comparing p 1 and x 2 , for example. Because these problems occur when there are more than two elements of the same lottery in the set Θ n , we then constrain the elements p i and x i to the same set of the partition of Θ n . So the constraint is used when #(Θ n ∩ l i ) > 2 (where # means cardinality and l i , as defined in Section 2, is the set of the elements of a lottery)
Definition 3: Admissible Partition
An admissible partition of Θ n is a two-set partition {Θ
to the same set of the partition of Θ n .
An Optimal Process is a series of partitions where each partition is ranked in the sense of Definition 2 and the sets of admissible partitions is constrained as in Definition 3. The first set considered is the union of elements of the two lotteries.
Definition 4: Optimal Process (OP)
An OP for a set Θ 1* = l 1 ∪ l 2 is a collection of sets {Θ and the other three elements, the partition {{0.6,0.2}, {10,35}} is still optimal because there is no other partition that yields (∅,∅,∅,∅). For example Q(0.2) ∩ Q(0.8,10,35) = (P,∅,R,∅) and then for the first quality ∅ ⊂ P. Finally, for the set {0.6,0.2} the optimal partition is {{0.6},{0.2}}and
for {10,35} the partition is {{10},{35}}.
As we shall see in Section 5, for all lottery tests considered in this paper, an OP exists and is unique (see note 4).
Lottery evaluation
In this section we emphasize the role of qualities in the evaluation of lotteries. When an agent evaluates a set Θ n* , knowing the values of its two subsets Θ 2n* and Θ 2n+1* , he will select the first two qualities of each of the subsets Θ Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Prelec (1998) have pointed out that the shape of the w(p) function reflects the qualitative difference between the boundaries and the other probabilities. In the same spirit, judgments of one probability with its corresponding boundary are allowed. However, these judgments with a boundary will be used only when they are optimal for the agent. The lexicographic order relation ≺ L of Definition 2 sets whether the boundaries are used or not.
A boundary is optimal for judging a probability if there is an element p i ∈ S of a set {p i ,θ} that is less different from its corresponding boundary b p i than from the other element θ, where θ is either a probability or a monetary amount. In fact, θ is the element of Θ 
Results
We now present in Table 1 results that derive the judgments of the optimal processes associated with eleven tests found in the literature. As we shall see, they correspond to the fourteen facts listed in Section 2. The other possible tests are a combination of these eleven tests. The proofs are in the Appendix and their implications are discussed in Section 5.1.
( Table 1 here)
Examples and discussion
We now discuss the facts (JCE, CCE, common ratio, preference reversal …) along with the judgments obtained in Table 1 i) α X + X -, α HL , or α RS , α RI when Θ 2n* has respectively the qualities X -, H or R.
ii) α HH , α LL , when Θ 2n* contains the largest p i .
In order to emphasize the role of qualities and remain close to the other models in the literature, the evaluation of a lottery (1,x 1 ; p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) is represented by:
where Π 1 is the product of the parameter )) can be used to obtain Equation (1) but we do not discuss all of them in this article since it is beyond its scope. An example of such function is presented in note 6. We now apply Equation 1 to the different tests.
Tests 1, 2
The next example is about the comparison in the preference reversal paradox. In this section, we assume that p* = 4, the middle point in the interval [0.3,0.5] discussed in Section 3.1.
Example 5.1
In Tversky et al. (1990) we observe that 83% of the subjects choose (0.97,4) over (0.31,16). To explain the result we use the process of Test 1, so the judgments of the optimal process are J PX (J HL (p 1 , p 2 ), J X + X +(x 1 ,x 2 )). For the comparison of the two probabilities, the parameter α HL multiplies the highest probability 0.97 as we fixed above in (i) and Π 2 = α HL . There is no other parameter, since α X + X + and α PX are set equal to 1. For the evaluation of the first lottery, Equation 1 gives α HL (0.97 × 4) and for the second lottery we obtain (0.31×16). From the test result α HL (0.97 × 4) -(0.31×16) > 0 and α HL must be greater than 1.28 to obtain the desired result. We observe that the qualitative difference between elements of H and L increases the difference between the two p i , and Fact # 1 is explained. It is important to notice that the way we introduce the parameters does not affect the conclusion. If α HL would multiply the smallest probability 0.31 then α HL must be lower than 1/1.28 to explain the result. The parameter still increases the difference between probabilities.
Example 5.2 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) test sequentially a choice between (0.45, 6000) and (0.90, 3000) and another choice between (0.001, 6000) and (0.002, 3000).
86% of the subjects select the second lottery in the first task but 73% select the first lottery in the second task. This is the common ratio paradox. By using the same process of Example 5.1 with the parameter α HH , we obtain: α HH 0.90 × 3000 > 0.45 × 6000 and with the parameter α LL we obtain α LL 0.002 × 3000 < 0.001 × 6000 Consequently, we must have α HH > 1 > α LL to solve Fact # 2.
The next example is about the JCE (Fact # 3). one relevant parameter, since P and X are not taken into account by (i) and (ii).
From J RS (p 1 , b p 1 ), we have that α RS multiplies p 1 x 1 . We obtain α RS 0.95 × 96 = 70, which implies that α RS = 0.77. For a small probability, the lottery is overestimated and then the α RI > 1. This solves Fact #3. Consequently, the judgment of probabilities with boundaries is similar to the inversed S-shape used by Prelec (1998) , Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Wu and Gonzalez (1996) . See note 7. If we combine Test 2 and Test 1 (with the qualities of H and L), we explain the existence of the preference reversal paradox (Tversky et al. 1990 ).
The use of qualities to obtain an OP for Test 2 leads to almost the same judgment of probabilities as the one in NEU. However, for this test, we use judgments with boundaries instead of the function w(p i ). As the proof of Test 2 shows in Appendix, it is optimal, in our model, to judge a probability with a boundary to obtain the JCE.
In contrast, in Test 1 the judgment with boundaries was not shown to be optimal, since no boundary satisfies the condition. An example of judgment of two p i is to be found in Ranyard (1995) , where the subject says: "I've chosen option 2 because there's more chance of winning a smaller amount…" Then the agent clearly compares the two chances of winning or the two probabilities according to Test 1.
Consequently, qualities play an important role in defining an OP by allowing both kinds of judgment and by identifying when it is optimal to use one type of judgment (with a boundary) instead of the other (without a boundary). 
Tests 3, 4
Another important group of facts concerns the difference between the CCE and the JCE (Fact #3). Tversky et al. (1990) introduced the CCE in order to obtain a lottery price from a comparison with a sure monetary amount. As Bostic et al. (1990) have pointed out, this procedure is closer to the comparison of two lotteries than the JCE and can thus reduce the number of reversals. We will see that this is not necessarily the case. and then CCE = α RS JCE. Since α RS < 1 the JCE is larger than the CCE.
One can note that the reason why the use of the CCE decreases the number of reversals is not, in this paper, because the CCE is closer to the comparison of lotteries than the JCE. It is because there is an additional RxS effect: For p 1 ∈ H, the judgment of p 1 is with the probability 1 in both cases (Tests 2 and 3). However, for p 1 ∈ L, when we test the CCE, the agent first judges the probability, as in the JCE, and compares the result to the sure probability which involves another judgment that considers the qualities R and S (Test 4). So JCE > CCE.
Tests 5, 6, 7
Test 5 gives an optimal way to compare a lottery where x 1 > 0 with a lottery where x 1 = 0. Note that, in all tests, (1,x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) is preferred to (p 2 ,x 2 ) in a direct choice.
This test result obtained by Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) is foreseeable since, for both lotteries, you can win x 2 with probability p 2 and you can win x 1 with probability 1 − p 2 for the first lottery and 0 with probability 1-p 2 for the second one.
Test 5 gives x 1 + α RS p 2 (x 2 -x 1 ) for the first lottery and, for the second one, α RS p 2 x 2 .
So the difference in evaluation between the two lotteries is x 1 − α RS p 2 x 1 > 0. This is positive because both α RS and p 2 are smaller than 1. This explains Fact #8. When we consider the pricing of these lotteries, Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) obtained the surprising result discussed below.
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Example 5.5 Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) obtained that JCE of (p 2 ,x 2 ) > JCE of (1,x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) for the lotteries (1,x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) and (p 2 ,x 2 ) where x 2 = 96, x 1 = 24 and p 2 = 0.8.
We now show that this contradictory result can be rationalized. This test result is difficult to accept intuitively because the expected value of the lottery with the higher JCE is lower than the one for the other lottery p 2 x 2 < p 2 x 2 + (1-p 2 )x 1 .
In fact for the JCE of (p 2 ,x 2 ) we have α RS p 2 x 2 , and for the JCE of (1,x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) we use Test 6 and obtain J RS (J PX (1,x 1 ),J PX (J RS (p 2 ,b p 2 ),x 2 -x 1 )). So the evaluation of this lottery is x 1 + α RS α RS p 2 (x 2 -x 1 ). From Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) data, x 1 = 24, x 2 = 96 and p 2 = 0.8. So we have (Fact #7) x 1 + α RS α RS p 2 (x 2 -x 1 ) < α RS p 2 x 2 when α RS ∈]1/2,5/6[. This interval contains α RS = 0.77 which corresponds to the value found for the test in Example 5.3 . This result (Test 6), along with Test 5, involves a second reversal of preferences explained by the model. The first was explained by Tests 1 and 2 together.
For the lottery (1,24;p 2 ,72) where the agent can win 96 with probability p 2 and 24 otherwise, Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) 8 pointed out that the JCE of (1,24;p 2 ,72) is different from 24 + JCE of (p 2 ,72). Moreover, the spread between the two JCE decreases when the probability increases (Fact # 9). We can explain this result by taking the derivative of (JCE of (1,x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) -JCE of (p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 )) with respect to p 2 where p 2 ∈ H. The difference between the two JCE is equal to x 1 + α RS α RS p 2 (x 2 -x 1 ) -α RS p 2 (x 2 -x 1 ) and the derivative with respect to p 2 yields (α RS -1) α RS (x 2 -x 1 ) < 0, since α RS < 1 and x 2 > x 1 > 0. For p 2 ∈ L we obtain (α RS -1) α RI (x 2 -x 1 ) < 0 since α RI > 1 and α RS < 1.
One can note that we have a comparison with the boundaries as in the cases where x 1 = 0. This is the reason why the evaluation of these lotteries as a function of p 2 still has an inverse S-shaped curve, as discussed in footnote 7 (Fact # 9). When x i , x i-1 > 0 and p i ∈ L, the process for Test 7 gives CCE= x 1 + α RS α RI p 2 (x 2 -x 1 ). Test 6 gives JCE = x 1 + α RS α RI p 2 (x 2 -x 1 ) and CCE = JCE for low probabilities.
We have the same result when p i ∈ W. Then, for this type of lottery, there is no difference between JCE and CCE for all probabilities (Fact #10).
Tests 8, 9, 10, 11
These tests consider lotteries where x i-1 < 0 < x i . We first discuss the JCE and CCE.
The judgments of Tests 8, 10 and 11 are:
For these three OP, the judgment J X -X + has two parts. The first ones J PxX (1,-x 1 ) are the same for all processes and only the second parts differ. These second parts are identical to those of Tests 2, 3, and 4 respectively, where a monetary amount is equal to 0. So, for p 2 ∈ W, the JCE = CCE (Test 8 vs Test 10) and, for p 2 ∈ L, the JCE ≠ CCE (Test 8 with the boundary 0 vs Test 11) for the same reasons that apply for those used to explain Tests 2, 3 and 4. This explains why the test results obtained by Bostic et al. (1990) are the same as those in Fact #14 (Tversky et al., 1990) . Bostic et al. (1990) and Luce et al. (1993) use four pairs of lotteries taken from Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) . These tests are very difficult to explain since, contrary to the cases where x 1 = 0 or x 1 > 0 (Facts #7 and #8), the reversal does not occur systematically. So the value of each parameter is important. These tests also lotteries with low probabilities and high probabilities are respectively: Table 2 shows the results for the four cases where in each case A-B measures the difference between the lotteries A and B when they are compared. For these lotteries you can win x1 with probability p1 and x2 with probability 1-p1.
( Table 2 here)
So the lottery with the x 1 (x 1 < 0) closer to 0 is always selected in a direct comparison (Fact #12) and the reversals occur for lotteries 1 and 4 (Fact #13). The parameters we use fit the data well, in particular α X + X -= 2.25 taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which is the most significant (Fact #11).
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the concept of qualities is useful in two different ways. First the qualities settle the optimal process and, second, they are taken explicitly into account in the judgments. So the role played by qualities seems strong enough to justify the necessity of using them. As shown in Section 5, they serve as a powerful instrument in solving the fourteen facts in the literature (Section 2), which are the most significant for two-point lotteries.
This model can be extended to n point lotteries. Another way to continue the research is to try to explain the difference between the buying and selling prices.
Ambiguity is another interesting problem and the explanations of these last two problems seem to be closely related.
Notes
1. For x 1 < 0 < x 2 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) do not use segregation. This procedure of doing would not affect the result of this paper. Perhaps the best way is not to use segregation when x 1 and x 2 have almost the same size and to use it when they are very different.
2. p* is such that for p∈]0,1[ w(p) < p if p > p* and w(p) > p if p < p*.
3. For the partition Θ 1 = {p 1 ,x 1 ,x 2 } and Θ 2 = {p 2 }, the first quality of Q(Θ 1 ) ∩ Q(Θ 2 ) is P and for the partition Θ 3 = {x 1 ,p 1 ,p 2 } and Θ 4 = {x 2 } the first quality of Q(Θ 3 ) ∩ Q(Θ 4 ) is X. So X⊄P, P⊄X and P≠X and comparability fails.
4. There exists a unique OP, because for each set considered there is only one optimal partition. When #Θ n = 2 the result is obvious. When #(Θ n ∩ l i ) > 2 each set contains at least one element p i and one x i and the first quality is P∪X for each set. So if some elements have the quality X -and others have X + then putting each x i in one set according to these qualities is optimal. If all x i have the same quality then splitting them into two sets, according to R and S qualities, is optimal. This last splitting is always possible, since when a lottery has more than two elements there is always one p i with the quality R and another one with the quality S. So only one optimal partition is obtained by considering the first different qualities. When #(Θ n ∩ l i ) ≤ 2 and #Θ n > 2 there is always at least one p i and one x i . Since there is no restriction, splitting by using the first different qualities P and X will be optimal.
5. We make this assumption to emphasize the role of probabilities. This is equivalent to assuming a linear utility function. This procedure simplifies the discussion. In other words, a non−linear u(x i ) function (obtained from a judgment with another boundary x i = 0, pointed out in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ) would not affect the results in this paper. However, as in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , there is a difference between strictly positive and strictly negative monetary amounts. The first equation is standard, while when we put together the result of (2) and (3) by using (4) we obtain p 1 x 1 -p 2 x 2 . So these judgments lead to expressions with terms p i x i even though the agent is allowed to compare two p i or two x i and the evaluation of a lottery is given by Σp i x i . In Equation 5, the p i is judged by considering the boundary, in order to obtain a judged value of p i . Other functions could be used, such as J 2 (p 1 ,p 2 ) = p 1 /p 2 , for example. To obtain Equation 1, we consider qualities by taking into account (i) and (ii). The average of x i used in (2) and the one of p i used in (3) is also obtained by considering qualities.
7. As Prelec (1998) has pointed out, the closer the probabilities are to boundaries the greater the effect of RS or RI. We can take this fact into account by setting: α RS (p*)=1 and dα RI /dp < 0 for p < p* dα RS /dp > 0 for p > p*. The same idea could be applied to other parameters such as α HH for example.
8. They use the seller's point of view and not the neutral's one, but the result remains valid.
APPENDIX

Test 1
Let (p 1 ,x 1 ) be compared to (p 2 ,x 2 ), where Q(p 1 ) = (P,∅,R,H) = Q(p 2 ). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J PX (J HH (p 1 , p 2 ), J X + X +(x 1 ,x 2 )). 
Test 3
Let a lottery (p 1 ,x 1 ) be compared to a sure monetary amount (1,x 2 ), where Q(p 1 ) = (P,∅,R,H). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J PX (J RS (p 1 ,1), J X + X +(x 1 ,x 2 ).
Proof: The partition {{p 1 ,1}, {x 1 ,x 2 }} is optimal as in Test 1. Since Q(p 1 ,1) = Q(p 1 ,b p 1 ) we do not use boundaries. The judgments are the same as the ones in Test 2 except for J X + X + (x 1 ,x 2 ).
Test 4
Let a lottery (p 1 ,x 1 ) be compared to a sure monetary amount (1,x 2 ), where Q(p 1 ) = (P,∅,R,L). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J PX (J X + X +(x 1 ,x 2 ), (J SR (J RI (p 1 ,b p 1 ), 1).
Proof: As in test 1, the optimal partition is {{1,p 1 },{x 1 ,x 2 }}. The optimal qualities for the probabilities are RS and X + X + for the monetary amounts. Since Q(p 1 ) ∩ Q(1) = (P,∅,∅,∅) ≺ L (P,∅,∅,L) = Q(p 1 ) ∩ Q(b p 1 ), we use the boundary. We have Q(p 1 ) = (P,∅,R,L) and Q(b p 1 ) = (P,∅,I,L) so the qualities used are I and R.
Test 5
Let (1,x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) be compared to (p 3 ,x 3 ), where Q(p 2 ) = (P,∅,R,H) = Q(p 3 ). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J SR (J PX (1, x 1 ), (J PX (J HH (p 2 , p 3 ), J X + X +(x 3 ,x 2 -x 1 )).
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, each p i and x i belong to the same set. x 3 ) the first partition is optimal. The partition of {p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ,p 3 ,x 3 } is as in Test 1 and there is only one partition for {1,x 1 }. We use the qualities R and S for the judgment of these two sets together.
Test 6
Suppose (1,x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) has to be evaluated where Q(p 2 ) = (P,∅,R,L). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J RS (J PX (1, x 1 ), ((J PX (J RI (p 2 , b p 2 ), x 2 -x 1 )).
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, p i and x i belong to the same set and we have only one admissible partition {{1,x 1 },{p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 }}. Since Q(1,x 1 ) = (P∪X,X + ,S,H) and Q(p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) = (P∪X,X + ,R,L), we use the qualities R and S. The boundary is used to obtain the value of p 2 .
Test 7
Let (1,x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) be compared to (1,x 3 ), where Q(p 2 ) = (P,∅,R,L). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J RS (J PX (J HH (1,1),J X + X +(x 1 ,x 3 )), J PX (J RI (p 2 ,b p 2 ), x 2 -x 1 ).
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, p i and x i belong to the same set. Q(1,1,x 1 ,x 3 ) ∩ Q(p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) = (X∪P,X + ,∅,∅) ≺ L (X∪P,X + ,S,H) = Q(1,x 1 ) ∩ Q(1,x 3 ,p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ) = Q(1,x 3 ) ∩ Q(1,x 1 ,p 2 ,x 2 -x 1 ).The partition of the first set is as in Test 1 and that of the second set is as in Test 2.
Test 8
Suppose (1,-x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 +x 1 ) has to be evaluated and Q(p 2 ) = (P,∅,R,H). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J X -X +(J PX (1, -x 1 ), ((J PX (J RS (p 2 , b p 2 ), x 2 +x 1 )).
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, p i and x i belong to the same set and there is only one partition. Since Q(1,-x 1 ) = (P∪X,X -,S,H) and Q(p 2 ,x 2 +x 1 ) = (P∪X,X + ,R,H) we use the qualities of X + and X -. The boundaries are used for p 2 .
Test 9
Let (1,-x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 +x 1 ) be compared to (1,-x 3 ;p 4 ,x 4 +x 3 ), where Q(p 2 ) = (P,∅,R,L) and Q(p 4 ) = (P,∅,R,H). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J X -X +(J PX (J HH (1, 1),J X -X -(-x 1 ,-x 3 )), (J PX (J LH (p 2 , p 4 ), J X + X +(x 2 +x 1 , x 4 +x 3 ))).
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, p i and x i belong to the same set. We have that the partition {{p 4 , p 2 ,x 4 +x 3 ,x 2 +x 1 }, {1,1,-x 1 ,-x 2 }} is optimal since this is the only partition where the intersection implies q 2 = ∅. The partition of each set is as in Test 1. Since Q(1,1,-x 1 ,-x 2 ) = (P∪X,X -,S,H), and Q(p 4 , p 2 ,x 4 +x 3 ,x 2 +x 1 ) = (P∪X,X + ,R,L) we use the qualities of X + and X -.
Test 10
Let (1,-x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 +x 1 ) be compared to (1,x 3 ), where Q(p 2 ) =(P,∅, R,H). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J X -X +(J PX (1,-x 1 ), ((J PX (J RS (p 2 ,1), J X + X +(x 2 +x 1 ,x 3 ))).
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, p i and x i belong to the same set and the partition {1,-x 1 } and {p 2 ,x 2 +x 1 , 1,x 3 } is optimal. The partition of the second set is as in Test 3.
Test 11
Let (1,-x 1 ;p 2 ,x 2 +x 1 ) be compared to (1,x 3 ) where Q(p 2 ) = (P,∅,R,L). Then the judgments of the optimal process are J X -X +(J PX (1,-x 1 ), J RS (J PX (1,x 3 ), J PX (J RI (p 2 ,b p 2 ), x 2 +x 1 )).
Proof: Since the first lottery has four elements, p i and x i belong to the same set. We have that{1,-x 1 } and {p 2 ,x 2 +x 1 , 1,x 3 } is optimal since (P∪X,∅,S,H) ≺ L (P∪X,X + ,∅,∅) which is the one of {1,-x 1 ,1,x 3 } and {p 2 ,x 2 +x 1 }. The partition of the second set is as in Test 4. Contrary to the case where x 1 = 0 and x 2 > 0, the reversals do not occur systematically. The calibration of the parameters obtained from other tests explains the reversals for lottery pairs 1 and 4 and consistent preferences for pairs 2 and 3, where α HH = α HL = 1.19.
